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Abstract
There are many lessons that bioethics can learn from the Holocaust. Forefront are
the lessons from the Nuremberg trials and the formation of research ethics. An oftenoverlooked lesson is how the Nazi regime was able to construct a hierarchy in such a way
that influenced people to act in horrendous ways. Fernandes & Ecret, writing in Conatus
– Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 2 (2019), highlight the influence of hierarchy on the moral
silence of nurses and physicians within the Nazi regime. While we greatly enjoyed the
paper, and think it is an important contribution, we find several misrepresentations of
current bioethical discourse. There is not a global acceptance of euthanasia or medical
aid in dying, the contemporary position in bioethics does not favor removal of consciencebased protections, and the lack of personal conscience-based protections was not the
main factor in the analysis of Nazi medical hierarchy. The authors’ overall conclusion
that their analysis suggests the importance of strengthening personal conscience-based
objections to prevent medical hierarchy from influencing immoral behavior misses the
more significant issue of institutional behavior. Instead, we argue, that the lessons from
the analysis of Nazi nurses and physicians speak to the importance of protecting patients
from institutional conscience-based objections that violate patient rights of access to
legal medical services. This paper will respond to the misrepresentations. We highlight
the growing threats to health care access from religious affiliated institutions, the threats
to professional ethics and physician and nurse scope of practice. We conclude that
the analysis by Fernandes & Ecret does point out an important lesson, but rather than
showing the importance of individual conscience protections, it speaks to the importance
of protecting patient rights.
Key-words: conscientious objection; patient rights; bioethics; organizational ethics;
professional ethics
*A. Fernandes, and D. Ecret, “The Effect of Hierarchy on Moral Silence in Healthcare: What
Can the Holocaust Teach Us?” Conatus - Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 2 (2019): 21-43.
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W

e read with great interest “The Effect of Hierarchy on Moral
Silence in Healthcare: What Can the Holocaust Teach Us?” by
Fernandes & Ecret, which presents a powerful and important
discussion of hierarchy and moral silence in healthcare.1 In the article, the
authors highlight the dangers of silence in the face of ethical violations,
encourage the moral voices of nurses and physicians, and believe the
lessons of the Shoah should be better materialized in professional
education. We agree!
The authors primarily hypothesize how ingrained hierarchy had a
role in shaping moral actions during the Holocaust. They are right that
it is foolish to ignore these lessons, giving way to the complacency that
it couldn’t happen here or now. We agree that hierarchy of the Nazi
regime worked to ensure physicians and nurses stayed silent and were
complicit. We, however, challenge the authors’ concluding assumptions
that:
i. there is a global acceptance of euthanasia and assisted suicide
in the “medical profession” for conditions such as depression,
schizophrenia, autism, addiction, and transgenderism.
ii. “contemporary” literature in bioethics favors removal of
conscience protection laws.
iii. lack of individual conscience protections was the main factor in
complicit behavior in the Shoah.
The authors conclude that these assumptions support the argument
for strengthening individual provider conscience protections against
the dangers of medical hierarchy, preventing moral silence. Ensuring
protections are important. The more prescient threat is not medical
hierarchy but religious affiliated organizations holding institutional
conscience-based refusals against offering medical services.
Hospitals that hold restrictive conscience-objections prohibit
staff from providing or discussing care with their patients. The US
government, instead of strengthening patient protections, is seeking to
expand protections for those entities.2
We will address our criticism of the three assumptions that Fernandes
& Ecret base their conclusion on. We will then show how the lessons
Ashley K. Fernandes, and DiAnn Ecret, “The Effect of Hierarchy on Moral Silence in Healthcare: What Can the Holocaust Teach Us ?” Conatus - Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 2 (2019):
21-43.
1

Ian D. Wolfe, and Thaddeus M. Pope, “Hospital Mergers and Conscience-Based Objections
– Growing Threats to Access and Quality of Care,” The New England Journal of Medicine 382
(2020): 1388-1389.
2
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from Fernandes & Ecret’s analysis seem to point towards the dangers
of an institution setting a specific conscience and overriding clinician
conscience and ethics against the rights of patients.
Assumption Ι
Assisted suicide, now referred to as medical aid in dying (MAID), is fairly
accepted in some medical professions, but there is by no means “global”
acceptance.3 Although MAID is certainly gaining momentum, it is legal in
only seven US jurisdictions, for limited indications, and a rigorous process for
access.4 The American Medical Association still considers it “fundamentally
incompatible with the physician’s role.”5 The American Nurses Association
only recently changed their policy around MAID that recognizes it as a legal
and ethical right, highlights the obligation of the nurse to support their
patient in that choice and through the process, but still maintain that nurses
are ethically prohibited from administering medications for that purpose.6
Further, euthanasia, which is different and distinct from MAID, remains illegal
in the United States, and most other countries. One or two instances in
history do not equate to accepted practice.
Assumption ΙΙ
The authors’ claim that contemporary bioethical literature supports
removal of conscience protection laws is false and is a mischaracterization
of this debate. The authors misrepresent Stahl & Emmanuel’s argument by
claiming it called for an end to conscience protection laws.7 The argument
Stahl & Emmanuel make is that a clinician should not be allowed to utilize
conscience protection laws to violate a patient’s right to access of a
legal and medically accepted treatment, particularly when the clinician is
federally funded or practices in an organization that receives public funds.
Patient rights must be the primary concern. Clinicians with consciencebased objections have a duty to disclose this to their employer so they can
accommodate patient access.
Bob Roehr, “Assisted Dying in US and Canada: Controversy Subsides after Legalization,” The
British Medical Journal 360 (2018): k503.
3

Thaddeus M. Pope, “Legal History of Medical Aid in Dying: Physician assisted Death in US
Courts and Legislatures,” New Mexico Law Review 48, no. 2 (2018): 267.
4

American Medical Association, “Physician-Assisted Suicide,” November 14, 2016, https://
www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/physician-assisted-suicide
5

ANA Ethics Advisory Board, “ANA Position Statement: The Nurse’s Role When a Patient Requests Medical Aid in Dying,” The Online Journal of Issues in Nursing 24, no. 3 (2019).
6

Ronit Y. Stahl, and Ezekiel J. Emanuel, “Physicians, not Conscripts-Conscientious Objection in
Health Care,” The New England Journal of Medicine 376, no. 14 (2017): 1380-1385.
7
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Savulescu & Schuklenk make a similarly nuanced argument that speaks
to the importance of the discussion.8 While they do call for an end to
conscience protection laws, they do so by demonstrating that objections
are often better grounded in professional codes of ethics and scope of
practice provisions. Their point, we believe, is not to silence professionals,
but rather to protect patients by putting the focus on individual patient
rights before a right to conscience-based objections by clinicians. Their
approach puts the burden onto the clinicians, who have more power than a
patient, by requiring them to base their objection in professional practice and
code of ethics rather than the more ambiguous reference to “conscience.”
We believe that individual conscience-based objections are a legitimate
and necessary moral exercise but that careful balance is needed to ensure
that patient rights are not overridden by the same type of mistaken medical
morality that led to faulty medical ethics by the Nationalist Socialists in
Nazi Germany.
There are certainly bioethicists calling for removal of individual
conscience objections, but not all.9 The debate in bioethics is not one
of consensus for blanket removal of conscience protections rather it is
more nuanced and is over the balance between patient access to legal and
professionally accepted care and respect for the individual conscience of
their healthcare provider in order to avoid morally tenuous scenarios.
Assumption III
Fernandes & Ecret’s conclusion that the Nazi regime indoctrinated
physicians and nurses to act immorally provides an important and valuable
lesson. It does speak to an element of individual conscience protections.
However, we believe that discussion of hierarchy and moral silence by health
professionals in the Nazi regime is more aptly analogized to the dangers of
institutional conscience-based protections and institutional power, namely
that a hierarchal structure such as a hospital can force its ideological beliefs
on the community it serves, even coopting employees as morally apathetic
agents of that hierarchy. Nazi physician’s and nurse’s individual objections
were not made because they were willful participants in the regime’s belief
structure.
Institutional conscience protections allow healthcare institutions to
decline provision of certain services based on their mission and values, even
Julian Savulescu, and Udo Schuklenk, “Doctors have no Right to Refuse Medical Assistance in
Dying, Abortion or Contraception,” Bioethics 31, no. 3 (2017): 162-170.
8

Mark R. Wicclair, “Is Conscientious Objection Incompatible with a Physician’s Professional
Obligations?” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 29, no. 3 (2008): 171-185.
9
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if such therapies are considered medically indicated. Institutional conscience
protections are widely supported by both federal and state laws.10
Fernandes & Ecret’s arguments make the case for why institutions
should not promote a particular “conscience” that might override individual
conscience. This becomes particularly important, and relevant, when
individual hospitals can promote conscience-based objections. Hospital
conscience-based objections interfere with patients’ rights to standard and
legally authorized treatments similar to the way in which the Nazi regime
reduced the rights of segments of the population, ensuring compliance from
their clinicians.
I. Institutional Conscience
Individual conscience protections do not seem to have been the problem in
the Holocaust, they could have spoken up, likely would have been punished.
The absence of these laws does not seem to have been the main culprit in
getting clinicians to act out their bidding. Rather, their analysis highlights
the dangers being a part of a collective entity that encroaches on the rights
of those they are supposed to serve in the name of an institutional belief
structure, engaging in group think and moral silence. Fernandes & Ecret are
correct that nurses and physicians have an obligation to speak up against
institutional practices they conscientiously and morally object to.
Clinicians who many find themselves working in a, for instance, Catholic
health care facility, are not constrained by objections to care, but rather
they are constrained by the inability to provide care.11 These are problems of
institutional restrictions to care, the provider can voice their objection about
a hospital not providing a legal medical service, but the patient still suffers a
denial of rights, delays in care, and sometimes inadequate treatment. In fact,
in some facilities a clinician cannot even counsel or advise a patient on how
to access a service outside of the institution without a risk of employment
violations.12
Fernandes & Ecret present an important and powerful analysis. But
their analysis supports the conclusion that patient rights and protections
are paramount. The ethical violations of Nazi physicians and nurses was not
Nadia N. Sawicki, “Protections from Civil Liability in State Abortion Conscience Laws,” Journal of the American Medical Association 322, no. 19 (2019): 1918-1920.
10

Maryam Guiahi, “Catholic Health Care and Women’s Health,” Obstetrics and Gynecology
131, no. 3 (2018): 534-537.
11

Debra B. Stulberg, Rebecca A. Jackson, and Lori R. Freedman, “Referrals for Services Prohibited in Catholic Health Care Facilities,” Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health 48, no.
3 (2016): 111-117.
12
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a failure of conscience-based protections but a violation, by omission and
commission, of people because of the “conscience” of the institution, or
regime. They were complicit while the rights of those they were supposed to
serve were reduced and eliminated. It is faulty to believe that one could have
achieved justice through conscience protections in a wholly unjust society.
The reason this distinction is important, and why these lessons are
relevant today is that conscience-based objections in healthcare have risen
to the level of social discussion. However, there is a distinction that is
getting lost in the discourse. This distinction is between the conscience of an
individual clinician (nurse, physician) and the conscience of an entity such as a
hospital (institutional conscience).
II. The Balance of Conscience and Rights
The balance between conscience and rights has been shifting in the US,
as Catholic hospitals are merging with and acquiring hospitals around
the country.13 Problematic institutional consciences are not isolated to
religiously-affiliated hospitals, this is our point. They are only currently
emblematic of the dangers around allowing institutions to push particularly
restrictive belief structures. One could imagine a secular institution
employing some other restrictive conscience. As major policy initiatives
are being attempted through the expansion of federal conscience rules that
would expand what services and to whom services can be denied.14 These
policies favor institutional conscience over that of patient rights to access
basic, standard, and legally accepted healthcare services, even when their
own insurance policies allow for access. A clinician should maintain the right
to refuse participation in controversial procedures, but not ones considered
basic or urgent care. Institutional conscience policies also place physicians
and nurses in a compromising position, one that can lead to moral distress in
the face of concerns for employment violations.15 This becomes the problem
that Fernandes & Ecret warn of, institutional silencing of individual morals
and professional codes of ethics leading to the harm of patients.
The shift towards institutional conscience protections also impacts the
professional ethics of the clinical staff within the organization, just as Fernandes
& Ecret detail in their account of Nazi physicians and nurses. While the authors
Maryam Guiahi, “Religious Refusals to Long-Acting Reversible Contraceptives in Catholic
Settings: A Call for Evidence,” American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology 222, no. 4
(2019): S869.e1-S872.e5.
13

Lawrence O. Gostin, “The ‘Conscience’ Rule: How will it affect Patients’ Access to Health
Services?” Journal of the American Medical Association 321, no. 22 (2019): 2152-2153.
14

15

Guiahi, “Religious Refusals,” S870.
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make the argument that the lessons of the Shoah speak to the importance of
individual conscience protections for physicians and nurses, we believe the more
compelling and prescient argument is the protection of patients, and citizens,
from institutional power. If hospitals have more power over patients, patients’
rights may be violated, even making nurses and physicians complicit. The balance
is recognizing the rights and responsibilities in both patients and clinicians
without overly endowing power to the institution. The lessons from the Shoah,
in Fernandes & Ecret’s analysis, are that moral silence is unjust and institutional
power needs to be checked. Individual clinician conscience regulations are too
easily corrupted by institutional power. Without the dissolution of institutional
conscience protections or the acceptance of conscientious provision protections,
institutions will have too much power over patients and clinicians, and it is likely
that history will sadly continue to repeat itself.
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